One Union.
Different responses.
On 12 March 2026 the International Criminal Court opened an investigation into the “Situation Lithuania/Belarus” — cross-border crimes against Belarusians pushed onto Lithuanian territory. Over the same 2020–2025 period, decisions by EU national agencies on Belarusian asylum seekers diverge by an order of magnitude.
How EU national agencies apply EU policy
Eurostat data is annual: figures for 2026 will not be published before mid-2027. According to the Polish Office for Foreigners, in June 2026 decisions on applications by Belarusian citizens included 25 grants of protection and 52 rejections; from January to May the rejection rate was 4.4%. UDSC · migracje.gov.pl
Where we are.
The European Parliament has recognised the Lukashenka regime as illegitimate. It has adopted dozens of resolutions — from sanctions to non-recognition of the 2025 election. The EU has allocated €200 million to Belarusian civil society. In March 2026 the ICC opened an investigation in the “Lithuania/Belarus” case.
At the EU level the position is clear.
At the level of national asylum agencies the statistics differ. Lithuania grants protection to 80% of Belarusian asylum seekers. Poland — 97%. Germany — 11%. Sweden — 8%.
This is not malice and not bad countries.
Belarus's neighbours — Lithuania and Poland — have direct knowledge of the context: what Telegram post leads to a prison term right now, what the “Peramoha plan” is, how Belarusian political policing works. At BAMF and OFPRA the evidentiary bar has historically been higher: without a criminal case file or visible signs of repression, an application enters a risk zone. The profile of applicants also differs: people fleeing acute persecution reach the neighbours; those who reach Germany or France often had time in third countries first.
We document this gap — data, cases, context. So that what Europe has decided reaches those it was decided for.
To be heard.